Page info: *Author: Mathiesen, H. *Document version: 2.5. *Copyright 1997-2010, ViamInvest. Legal notice.

Table: International corporate governance - Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in various countries as of 1980-1995:

• Developing countries
• Germany
• Japan
• Anglo-American countries
• Denmark

Introduction: Some of the characterizations can be found in Shleifer and Vishny [1996, pages 49-55]. Precautionary statement: The first version of this table was primarily made out of memory and consequently it lacks adequate references and may contain errors about the actual legal and empirical state of the different institutions. As time passes more references will be added.

Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in developing countries as of 1980-1995

A) Laws influencing the market for corporate control.

Legal state: Not accounted.

Empirical state: Because most large firms are hold by families or governments this market is inactive compared to the governance systems of more developed countries.

Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in Germany as of 1980-1995

A) Laws influencing the market for corporate control.

Legal state: Several obstacles in the market for corporate control.

Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically impossible to get around the large German investors.

Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in Japan as of 1980-1995

A) Laws influencing the market for corporate control.

Legal state: Several obstacles in the market for corporate control.

Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically impossible to get around the large Japanese investors.

Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in Anglo-American countries as of 1980-1995

A) Laws influencing the market for corporate control.

Legal state: Few obstacles in the market for corporate control.

Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, and indeed the most active in the world with regard to hostile takeovers.

Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm market for corporate control in Denmark as of 1980-1995

A) Laws influencing the market for corporate control.

Legal state: Several obstacles in the market for corporate control.

Empirical state: The market for corporate control is very active, but this is not so with regard to hostile takeovers. The reason is that it is practically impossible to get around the large German investors.

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