|
||||
|
Table: International corporate governance - Tentative
characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy systems
in various countries as of 1980-1995: Introduction: Some of the characterizations can be found in Shleifer and Vishny [1996, pages 49-55]. Precautionary statement: The first version of this table was primarily made out of memory and consequently it lacks adequate references and may contain errors about the actual legal and empirical state of the different institutions. As time passes more references will be added. |
||||
|
Tentative characterizations of legal
and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy
systems in developing countries as of 1980-1995 |
||||
|
A) Laws that
protect creditors. |
Legal state: Not accounted. Empirical state: Bankruptcies seems to be more common than in other
kinds of governance systems, probably caused by the higher degree of economic
instability in developing countries rather that flaws in the bankruptcy system. |
|||
|
Tentative characterizations of legal
and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy
systems in |
||||
|
A) Laws that
protect creditors. |
Legal state: Tougher regulation. No chapter 11 protects the
management and the owners from the creditors. Empirical state: Large firms are seldom bankrupted. However, if
thing goes very wrong the large institutional investors often take temporary
control in order to restructure the firm and possibly replace the management. |
|||
|
Tentative characterizations
of legal and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy systems in |
||||
|
A) Laws that
protect creditors. |
Legal state: Softer regulation: E.g. managers and owners are
protected against creditors by ‘chapter 11’ like regulation. Empirical state: Large firms are observed to go into ‘chapter 11’
like protection but it is very seldom that they bankrupt entirely. |
|||
|
Tentative characterizations of legal
and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy systems
in Anglo-American countries as of 1980-1995 |
||||
|
A) Laws that
protect creditors. |
Legal state: Softer regulation: E.g. managers and owners are
protected against creditors by chapter 11 regulation. Empirical state: Large firms are observed to go into chapter 11
protection but it is very seldom that they bankrupt entirely. |
|||
|
Tentative characterizations of legal
and empirical state of large firm bankruptcy
systems in |
||||
|
A) Laws that
protect creditors. |
Legal state: Tougher regulation. No chapter 11 protects the
management and the owners from the creditors. Empirical state: Large firms are seldom bankrupted. However, if
thing goes very wrong the large institutional investors often take temporary
control in order to restructure the firm and possibly replace the management. |
|||
|
- Copyright 1997-2018, H. Mathiesen. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Legal notice. |
||||
