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What is corporate governance?
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Key topics
 The big picture
 Stock price formation
 Fundamental value analysis
International corp. governance

Incentive mechanisms
 Decision system
Performance monitoring
 Incentive based compensation
 Bankruptcy system
 Ownership structure
 Creditor structure
 Capital structure
 Market for corporate control
Labor market competition
Product market competition

Related topics
Transaction cost economics
 Positive economics



Encyclopedia references

Using references: To find the full reference of Coase [1960] click Ci-Cz below and move down alphabetically on the resulting web page. Tip: Click Ci-Cz to get the page containing Coase. Then type [Ctrl + F] to launch the find function. Type Coase and click find.

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Radice, H. K. (1971). “Control Type, Profitability and Growth in Large Firms: An Empirical Study,” The Economic Journal, Sept., 547-562.


Radner, Roy (1985). “Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting,” Econometrica, 53, 5, 1173-1198.


Rajan, Raghuram (1992). “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choise Between Relationships and Arms-Length Debt,” Journal of Finance, 47, 1367-1400.


Rajan, Raghuram, and Henri Servaes (1995). “The Effect of Market Conditions on Initial Public Offerings,” Manusctipt, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.


Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales (1995). “What Do We Know about Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460.


Rappaport, Alfred (1989). “The Staying Power of the Public Corporation,” Harvard Business review, 1, 96-104.


Ravenscraft, D. J., and F. M. Scherer (1987). “Mergers, Sell-offs and Economic Efficiency. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.


Reburn, James Patrick (1994). "A Note on Firm Size, Information Availability and Market Reactions to US Stock Ownership Announcements," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 21, 3, 445-455.


Reinganum, Marc (1981). “Misspecifications of Capital Asset Pricing: Empirical Anomalies Based on Earnings’ Yields and Market Values,” Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 19-46.


Reinganum, Marc (1983). “The Anomalous Stock Market Behavior of Small Firms in January: Empirical Test for Tax-Loss Selling Effects,” Journal of Financial Economics, June, 89-104.


Reinganum, Marc (1988). “The Anatomy of a Stock Market Winner,” Financial Analysts Journal, 43, 16-28.


Rendleman, R., C. Jones, and H. Latané (1982). “Empirical Anomalies based on Unexpected Earnings and the Importance of Risk Adjustments,” Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 3, 269-287.


•Report of the Committee on• The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance,” Gee, Professional Publishing Ltd., London.


Reyes, Mario G. (1999). “Size, Time-varying Beta, and Conditional heteroscedasticity in UK Stock Returns,” Review of Financial Economics, 8, 1-10.


Rhoades, S. A., and R. D. Rutz (1982). “Market Power and Firm Risk: A Test of the Quit Life Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 9, 73-85.


Richey, Brenda, and Ada Demb (1994). “Defining Responsible Ownership: Cross-National Perspectives,” European Management Journal, 12, no. 3, 287-297.


Rice, P., and K. Smith (1977). "An Econometric Model of the Petroleum Industry," Journal of Econometrics, 6, 263-287.


Ritter, Jay (1991). “The Long Run Performance of IPOs,” Journal of Finance, 46, 3-27.


Roberts, Donal R. (1956). “A General Theory of Executive Compensation Based on Statistically Tested Propositions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 3.


Roe, Mark J. (1990). “Political and legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 7-42.


Roe, Mark J. (1991). “A Political Theory of Corporate Finance,” Colombia Law Review, 10.


Roe, Mark J. (1994a). “Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan, and America,” in Instututional Investors and Gorporate Governance, edited by Baum, T., T. Bauxbaum, and Klaus J. Hope. Berlin: De Gruyter.


Roe, Mark J. (1994b). “Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance,” Princeton, NJ: University Press.


Roe, Mark J. (1997). “The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, 4, 8-22.


Rogerson, W. (1985). “The First-Order Approach to Principal Agent Problems,” Econometrica, 53, 1357-1368.


Roll, R. (1979). “A Reply to Mayers and Rise (1979),” Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 370-380.


Roll, R. (1983). “The Turn-of-the-Year Effect and the Return Primia for Small Firms,” Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter, 18-28.


Roll, R. (1986). “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers,” Journal of Business, 59, no. 2, part 1, 197-216.


Roll, R and S. A. Ross (1994). “On the Cross-section Relation Between Expected Returns and Betas,” Journal of Finance, 49, 1, 101-121.


Romano, Roberta (1993a). “The Genius of American Corporate Law,” Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press.


Romano, Roberta (1993b). “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,” Columbia Law Review, 93, 795-853.


Rose, N., and C. Wolfram (2000). “Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation, Working Paper, MIT.


Rosen, Sherwin (1982). “Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 311-323.


Rosen, Sherwin (1990). “Contracts and the Market for Executives,” National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, 3542.


Rosen, Sherwin (1992). “Contracts and the Market for Executives,” in Lars Wein and Hans Wijkander, eds., Contract Economics, Blackwell Publishers, 181-217.


Rosenberg, Barr, Kenneth Reid, and Ronald Lanstein (1985). “Pursuasive Evidence of Market Inefficiency, “ Journal of Portfolio Management, 11, 9-17.


Rosenstein, S., and J. G. Wyatt (1990). “Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 26, 175-191.


Rosenstein, S., and J. G. Wyatt (1997). “Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, 44, 2, 229-250.


Ross, Stephen A. (1973). “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principals Problem,” American Economic Review, 63, 2 , May, 134-139.


Ross, Stephen A. (1976). “The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing,” Journal of Economic Theory, December, 343-362.


Ross, Stephen A. (1977). “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach,” Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 23-40.


Rosset, J. (1990). “Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 263-282.


Round, David K. (1976). “The Effect of the Separation of Ownership and Control on Large Firm Profit Rates in Australia: An Exploratory Investigation,” Rivista Internztionale Di Scienze Economiche e Commercial, 23, 426-436.


Rozeff, Michael and Mir Zaman (1988). "Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence," Journal of Business, 61, 25-44.


Rozeff, Michael and Mir Zaman (1998). "Overreaction and Insider Trading: Evidence from Growth and Value Portfolios," The Journal of Finance, LIII, 2, 701-716.


Rubinstein, M. E. (1973). “A Mean Variance Synthesis of Corporate Financial Theory,” Journal of Finance, March, 167-182.


Rumelt, Richard (1986). “Strategy, Structure, and Economoc Performance,” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press (first published 1974).


Ruud, P. A. (1984). “Tests of Specification in Econometrics,” Econometric Reviews, 3, 211-242.


Rydquist, Kristian (1987). “Empirical Investigation of the Voting Primium,” Northwestern University, Working Paper #35, Evanston, IL.


Ryngaert, Michael (1988). “The Effects of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 377-417.


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