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Hobt, Klaus, and Gunther Teubner, eds. (1985). “Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities,” Berlin: De Gruyter.
Hodoshima, Jiro, Xavier Garza-Gomez, and Michio Kunimura (2000). “Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis of Return and Beta in Japan,” Journal of Economics and Business, 52, 515-533.
Holderness, Clifford, Randall S. Kroszner, and Dennis Sheehan (1999). “Were the Good Old Days That Good?: Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression,” Journal of Finance, April, 54, 2, 435-469.
Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan (1985). “Raidors or Saviors? The Evidence in Six Controversial Investors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 4, 555-580.
Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan (1988a). “What Constrains Managers Who Own Large Blocks of Stock?,” Managerial Economics Research Center, Working Paper #88-07, University of Rochester.
Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan (1988b). “The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 317-347.
Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan (1991). “Monitoring an Owner: The Case of Turner Broadcasting,” Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 2, 325-347.
Holl, Peter (1975). “Effect of Control Type on the Firm in the U.K.,”Journal of Industrial Economics, 25, 257-271.
Holl, Peter (1977). “Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U.S. Corporations,”Journal of Industrial Economics, 25, 4, 259-438.
Holl, Peter, J. F. Pickering (1988). “The Determinants and Effects of Actual, Abandoned and Contested Mergers,”Managerial and Decision Economics, 9, 1, 1-20.
Holl, Peter, J. F. Pickering (1991). “Takeovers and Other Influences on Economic Performance: A Plant Level Analysis,”Applied Economics, 23, 11, 1779-1789.
Holmström, B. (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91.
Holmström, B. (1982a). “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki: Swedish School of Business.
Holmström, B. (1982b). “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324-340.
Holmström, B., and J. Ricard i Coster (1986). “Managerial Incentives and Capital Management,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 835-860.
Holmström, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan (2001). “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s,” Working Paper MIT, Department of Economics.
Holmström, Bengt, and Steven N. Kaplan (2001). “Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making sense of the 1980s and 1990s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, spring, 15, 2, 121-144.
Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom (1987). “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica, 55, no 2, 303-328.
Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom (1991). “Multitask Principal Agent Analysis: Incentive Contrasts Assets Ownership and Job Design,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 7, 24-52.
Holmström, B., and P. Milgrom (1994). “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American Economic Review, 84, 2, 972-991.
Holmström, B., and J. Tirole (1989). “The Theory of the Firm,” in Handbooks in Economics, R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig (eds.), Vol 1, no. 10. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 61-133.
Holthausen, R., and D. Larcker (1996). "The Financial Performance of Reversed Leverage Buyouts," Journal of Financial Economics, 42, 293-332.
Holthausen, R., D. Larcker and R. Sloan (1995a). "Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, 1, 29-74.
Holthausen, R., D. Larcker and R. Sloan (1995b). "Business Unit Innovation and the Structure of Executive Compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, 2-3, 279-313.
Horner, M. (1988). “The Value of Corporate Voting Right,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 12, 69-83.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1990). “Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships,” in R. G. Hubbard (ed.), Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 105-126.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1990). “The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan,” Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 67-88.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1991). “Corporate Structures, Liquidity and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 33-60.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein (1993). “The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: An Analysis of Post-Deregulation Corporate Finance in Japan,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper #4421, Cambridge MA.
Hoshi, Takeo, John McMillan, and Ulrike Schaede (1996). “Competition and Financial Structure in Japanese Firms,” Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, Draft: July 16..
Howton, Shelly W., and David R. Peterson (1999). “A Cross-Sectional Empirical Test of a Dual State Multi-Factor Pricing Model,” The Financial Review, 34, 47-64.
Hsia, C. C. (1981). “Coherence of the Modern Theories of Finance,” Financial review, Winter, 27-42.
Hsia, Chi-Cheng, Beverly R. Fuller, and Brian Y. J. Chen (2000). “Is Beta Dead or Alive?,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 27, 3, 283-311.
Hsiao, C. (1983). "Identification," In Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Hsiao, Cheng (1986). "Analysis of Panel Data," Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hu, Kiaoqiang, and Thomas D. Willett (2000). “The Variability of Inflation and Real Stock Returns,” Applied Financial Economics, 10, 655-665.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Darius Palia (1995a). “Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Aquiring Firms,” NBER Working Paper #5079.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Darius Palia (1995a). “Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Aquiring Firms,” The Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 4, 782-792.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Darius Palia (1995b). “Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry,” Journal of Financial Economics, 39, 105-130.
Hughes, A (1989). “The Impact of Merger: A Survey of Empirical Evidence for the UK,” In J. Fairburn and J. Key (eds), Mergers and Merger Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume, David (1748). “An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” reprinted 1955. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Hunt, Bishop Carleton (1936). “The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800-1867,” Chambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hunt, H. G. (1986). “The Separation of Corporate Ownership and Control: Theory, Evidence and Implications,” Journal of Accounting Literature, 5, 85-124.
Hutchison, T. W. (1938). “The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory,” New York, Augustus M. Kelley.