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Key topics
 The big picture
 Stock price formation
 Fundamental value analysis
 
International corp. governance


Incentive mechanisms
 Decision system
 
Performance monitoring
 Incentive based compensation
 Bankruptcy system
 Ownership structure
 Creditor structure
 Capital structure
 Market for corporate control
 
Labor market competition
 
Product market competition


Related topics
 
Transaction cost economics
 Positive economics


 

 


Encyclopedia references

Using references: To find the full reference of Coase [1960] click Ci-Cz below and move down alphabetically on the resulting web page. Tip: Click Ci-Cz to get the page containing Coase. Then type [Ctrl + F] to launch the find function. Type Coase and click find.

A-Ak  Al-Az  B-Ba  Bb-Bl  Bm-Bz  C-Ch  Ci-Cz  D-De  Df-Dz  E  F  G-Gq  Gr-Gz  H-Ha  Hb-Hn  Ho-Hz  I  J-Ja  Jb-Jz  K-Ke  Kf-Kz  L-Ld  Le-Lz  M-Maq  Mar-Mat  Mau_Me  Mf-Mz  N  O  P-Pn  Po-Pz  Q  R  S-Sg  Sh-Ss  St-Sz  T  U  V  W-Wh  Wi-Wz  Y  Z  Ø


H-Ha  

Hadlock, Charles J. (1998). "Ownership, Liquidity and Investment," Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 3, 487-508.

 

Hadlock, Charles J., and Gerald B. Lumer (1997). "Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence," Journal of Business, 70, 153-188.

 

Hagstrom, Robert G. (1994) “The Warren Buffett Way: Investment Strategies of the World’s Greatest Investor,” John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

 

Hahn, Hans, Otto Neurath, and Rudolf Carnap (1929). “Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kriech,” reprinted in 1973 in Otto Neurath (ed.), Empiricism and Sociology, trans. by Paul Foulkes and Marie Neurath, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 299-318.

 

Hall, B. H. (1988). “The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development,” In A. J. Auerback (ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

Hall, B. H. (1991). “Corporate Restructuring and Investment Horizons,” NBER Working Paper Number 3348, Cambridge, MA.

 

Hall, Bronwyn, Clint Cummins, Elisabeth Laderman, and Joy Mundy (1988). “The R&D Masterfile Documentation. Technical Working Paper no. 72 NBER.

 

Hall, Brian, and Jeffrey Liebman (1998). “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 3, 653-691.

 

Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy (2000). “Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,” American Economic Review, 90, 2, 209-214.

 

Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy (2002). “Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 1, 3-42.

 

Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy (2003). “The Trouble with Stock Options,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, 3, 49-70.

 

Hall, R. L., and C. J. Hitch (1939). “Price Theory and Business Behaviour,” Oxford Economic Papers, no. 2:12, 12-45.

 

Han, Ki C., David Y. Suk (1998). "Insider Ownership and Signals: Evidence from Stock Split Announcement Effects," The Financial Review, 33, 1-24.

 

Hansen, K. Carsten (1986). “Årsregnskabsloven-en teoretisk analyse,” Samfundslitteratur.

 

Hansen, Lars Peter (1982). “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,” Econometrica, 50, 1029-1054.

 

Hansen, Mogens Dilling, Tor Eriksson, Erik Strøjer Madsen, and Valdemar Smidh (1997). ”Firm Productivity Growth and Competition,” Discussion Papers 97-22, Copenhagen University, Department of Economics.

 

Hansen, Mogens Dilling, Tor Eriksson, Erik Strøjer Madsen, and Valdemar Smidh (1998). ”Market Structure, Publicly and Privately Financed R&D Spending- Empirical Evidence from Denmark,” Discussion Papers 98-20, Copenhagen University, Department of Economics.

 

Hansmann, Henry (1988). “Ownership of the Firm,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 4, 267-304.

 

Hansmann, Henry (1995). “The Ownership of Enterprise,” Manuscript, Yale University.

 

Haraf, William S. (1997). "Four Goals for a Stronger US Service Industry (and five Ways for Congress to help us get there)," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9, 4, 82-85.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1978). “Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education, and Unemployment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement,” American Economic Review, 68, 20-30.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1979). “Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 231-259.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1988a). “Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 55-86.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1988b). “Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 203-235.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1990). “Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt,” Journal of Finance, 45, 321-350.

 

Harris, Milton, and Arthut Raviv (1991). “The Theory of Capital Structure,” The Journal of Finance, 46, no. 1, March, 297-355.

 

Harrison, A. (1994). “Productivity, Imperfect Competition, and Trade Reform: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of International Economics, 36, 53-73.

 

Hart, O. D. (1983). “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,” Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 366-382.

 

Hart, O. D. (1995). “Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure,” London: Oxford University Press.

(foundations of contract theory q. p. 6 S&V, also S&V p21 on bords of directores part II

 

Hart, O. D., and B. Holmström (1987). “The Theory of Contracts,” In Advances of Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress, ed. T. Bewley. Cambridge University Press.

 

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1988). “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, 56, 755-785.

 

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, no. 6, 1119-1158.

 

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1994b). “The Governance of Exchanges: Members’ Cooperative versus Outside Ownership,” Manuscript, Harvard University.

 

Hart, Oliver D., and John Moore (1995). “Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management,” American Economic Review, 85, 567-585.

 

Hart, Oliver D., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1995). “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,” Manuscript, Harvard University.

 

Harvey (1989). “Time-varying Conditional Covariances in Tests of Asset Pricing Models,” Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 289-317.

 

Haskel, J. (1990). “Imperfect Competition, Work Practices and Productivity Growth,” Economics Depertment, Queen Mary and Westfield College, London, mimeo.

 

Haubrich, Joseph (1994). “Risk Aversion, Performance Pay and the Principal-Agent Problem,” Journal of Political Economy, 102, 2, 258-276.

 

Haugen, Robert (1995). ”The New Finance: The Case Against Efficient Markets,” Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

 

Haugen, R. A., and L. W. Senbet (1979). “New Perspectives on Informational Asymmetry and Agency Relationships,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 14, 4, 671-694.

 

Hausman, J. A. (1975). “An Instrumental Variable Approach to Full Information Estimators for Linear and Certain Nonlinear Econometric Models,” Econometrica, 43, 727-738.

 

Hausman, J. A. (1978). “Specification Tests in Econometrics,” Econometrica, 46, 1251-1271.

 

Hausman, J.A. and Taylor, W.E. (1982). "A Generalized Specification Test," Economics Letters, 8, 239-245.

 

Hay, Jonathan, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1996). “Toward a Theory of Legal Reform,” European Economic Review, forthcoming.

 

Hay, Jonathan, and Andrei Shleifer (1998). “Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform,” American Economic Review, 88, 2, 398-403.

 

Hayek, Friedrich (1945). “The use of knowledge in society,” American Economic Review, 35, September, 519-530.

 

Hayek, Friedrich (1967). “Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics,” London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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