Welcome to Encycogov
What is corporate governance?
 About Encycogov - FAQ

Key topics
 The big picture
 Stock price formation
 Fundamental value analysis
International corp. governance

Incentive mechanisms
 Decision system
Performance monitoring
 Incentive based compensation
 Bankruptcy system
 Ownership structure
 Creditor structure
 Capital structure
 Market for corporate control
Labor market competition
Product market competition

Related topics
Transaction cost economics
 Positive economics



Encyclopedia references

Using references: To find the full reference of Coase [1960] click Ci-Cz below and move down alphabetically on the resulting web page. Tip: Click Ci-Cz to get the page containing Coase. Then type [Ctrl + F] to launch the find function. Type Coase and click find.

A-Ak  Al-Az  B-Ba  Bb-Bl  Bm-Bz  C-Ch  Ci-Cz  D-De  Df-Dz  E  F  G-Gq  Gr-Gz  H-Ha  Hb-Hn  Ho-Hz  I  J-Ja  Jb-Jz  K-Ke  Kf-Kz  L-Ld  Le-Lz  M-Maq  Mar-Mat  Mau_Me  Mf-Mz  N  O  P-Pn  Po-Pz  Q  R  S-Sg  Sh-Ss  St-Sz  T  U  V  W-Wh  Wi-Wz  Y  Z  Ø


Ciecel, David H., and Thomas M. Carroll (1980). “The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 62, 1, 7-13.


Clare, A. D., R. Priestley, and S. H. Thomas (1998). “Reports of Beta’s Death are Premature: Evidence from the UK,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 22, 1207-1229.


Clark, Robert (1985). “Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties,” in J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser, eds. Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.


Clements, A. W. (1985). “Company-Bank Relationship,” D. B. Zenoff, International Banking - Management and Strategies, Euromony Publications, 151-155.


Coase, Ronald H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, N.S. 4, 386-405.


Coase, Ronald H. (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44.


Coase, Ronald H. (1982). “George J. Stigler: An Appreciation,” Regulation, 6, 6, 21-24.


Coase, Ronald H. (1984). “The New Institutional Economics,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, March, 229-231.


Coase, Ronald H. (1990). “Accounting and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, 1-3, 3-13.


Coffee, John (1991). “Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,” Columbia Law Review, 91, 1277-1368.


Cohen, W. M., and R. C. Levin (1989). “Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure,” In R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


Cole, R., and H. Mehran (1997). “The Effect of Changes in Ownership Structure on Performance: Evidende from the Thrift Industry,” Mimeograph, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.


Comment, Robert, and Gregg Jarrell (1995). “Corporate Focus and Stock Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics, 37, 67-87.


Comment, Robert, and G. William Schwert (1993). “Poison or Placebo?: Evidence on the Deterrent and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures,” Journal of Financial Economics, 39, 3-44.


Commons, John R. (1934). “Institutional Economics,” Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.


Conyon, Martin J. (1997). “Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 493-509.


Conyon, Martin J., P. Gregg, and S. Machin (1995). “Taking Care of Business: Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom,” The Economic Journal, 105, 704-714.


Conyon, Martin J., and Kevin J. Murphy (2000). “The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom,” The Economic Journal, 110, November, F640-F671.


Cooley, T., and S. LeRoy (1985). “Atheoretical Macroeconomics: A Critique,” Journal of Monatary Economics, 16, 283-308.


Cooter, Robert (1982). “The Cost of Coase,” Journal of Legal Studies, 11, 1-33.


Cooter, Robert, and Thomas Ulen (1988). “Law and Economics,”   Harper Collins Publishers.


Copeland, Thomas E., and D. Mayers (1982). “The Value Line Egnigma (1965-1978): A Case Study of Performance Evaluation Issues,” Journal of Financial Economics, Nov.,289-321.


Copeland, Thomas E., and J. Fred Weston (1988). “Financial Theory and Corporate Policy,” Third edition, Addison Wesley USA.


Copeland, Thomas E., T. Koller, and J. Murrin (1996). “Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies,” Second edition. McKinsey & Company, Inc. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.


Corbett, Jenny (1994). "An Overview of the Japanese Financial System," in Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, Nicholas Dimsdale and Martha Prevezer, (Eds.). Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press.


Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larker (1999). “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer, Compensation, and Firm Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406.


Core, John E., Wayne Guay, and David F. Larker (2002). “Executive Equity Compensation, and Incentives: A Survey,” Working Paper, Warton School.


Core, John E., Wayne Guay, and Randell S. Thomas (2005). “Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay without Performance? A Review of: Pay Without Performance by Bebchuck and Fried,” Working Paper.


Cornell, Bradford (1979). "Asymmetric Information and Portfolio Performance Measurement," Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 381-390.


Cornell, B., and Roll, R. (1981). “Strategies for Pairwise Competitions in Markets and Organizations,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 1, 201-213.


Cosh, Andrew (1975). “The Remuneration of Chief Executives in the Unted Kingdom,” Economic Journal, 85, 1, 74-94.


Cosh, A., and A. Hughes (1997). “Executive Remuneration, Executive Dismssal and Institutional Shareholdings,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 4, 469-492.


Cosh, A., A. Hughes, A. Singh, J. Carty, and J. Plender (1990). “Takeovers and Short-termism in the UK”, IPPR Industrial Policy Paper No. 3.


Cotter J. F., and M. Zenner (1994). “How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process,” Journal of Financial Economics, 35, 63-97.


Coughlan, Anne, and Ronald Schmidt (1985). “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 43-66.


Cowling, K. G. (1976). “On the Theoretical Specification of Structure-Performance Relationships,” European Economic Review, 8, Oct., 1-14.


Coyle, Martin A., et al (1991a). “A New Compact for Owners and Directors,” by The Working Group on Corporate Governance, Harvard Business Review, July-August 1991.


Coyle, Martin A., et al (1991b). “Advice and Dissent: Rating the Corporate Governance Compact,” a comment on the July-August 1991 H.B.R. ”A New Compact for Owners and Directors”, statement by three prominent business experts, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1991.


Cox, Archibald (1958). “The legal nature of collective bargaining agreements,” Michigan Law Review, 57, November, 1-36.


Cragg, J. (1967). "On the Relative Small-Sample Properties of Several Structural-Equation Estimators," Econometrica, 35, 89-110.


Cremer, Jacques (1995). “Arm’s Length Relationships,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX, 275-296.


Crystal, G. (1990). “The Great CEO sweepstakes,” Fortune, June 16, 94-102.


Cubbin, J., and D. Leech, (1983). “The Effect of Shareholder Dispersion on the Degree of Control in British Companies: Theories and Measurement,” Economic Journal, 93, 35-69.


Cubbin, J., and D. Leech, (1986). “Growth versus Profit-Maximization: A Simultaneous Equations Approach to Testing the Marris Model,” Managerial and Decisions Economics, 7, 123-131.


Curcio, Riccardo (1994). “The Effect of Managerial Ownership of Shares and Voting Concentration on Performance,” The Centre for Economic Performance DP No. 185, January, London School of Economics.


Cyert, Richard M., and James G. March (1963). “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm,” Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.


Copyright © 1999 - 2019 H. Mathiesen. All rights reserved. Contact Encycogov