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Table: Managerial ownership and performance - Empirical studies

 

Introduction: This table lists many of the more prominent empirical studies on the relation between managerial ownership and performance. The studies have been categorized by five hypotheses that simply express a particular mathematical connection between managerial ownership and corporate performance. As argued by Milton Friedman [1953] any hypothesis can be associated with an indefinite number of explanations. This table also mentions a few of the explanations that underlie the five hypotheses. You may click the links to get more info on the different explanations and to view the details of each empirical study.

 

Studies mainly indicating support for hypothesis 1:

Corporate performance is an increasing function of managerial ownership. Underlying explanation can be:

1) Incentive alignment argument

Studies mainly indicating support for hypothesis 2:

Corporate performance is a decreasing function of managerial ownership: Underlying explanation can be:

1) Entrenchment argument

2) Cost of capital argument

Studies mainly indicating support for hypothesis 3:

Corporate performance is a non-monotonous function of management ownership. Underlying explanation can be:

1) Stult's integrated theory

2) Morck et. al.'s combined theory

Studies mainly indicating support for hypothesis 4:

Managerial ownership is an increasing function of corporate performance. Underlying explanation can be:

1) Reward argument

2) Insider-reward argument

3) Insider-investment argument

Studies mainly indicating support for hypothesis 5:

No effects of managerial ownership on corporate performance and / or vise versa. Underlying explanation can be:

1) Natural selection argument

2) Mutual neutralization argument

Han and Suk [1998]

Holthausen and Larcker [1996]

Mehran [1995]

Jain and Kini [1994]

Cotter and Zenner [1994]

Song and Walkling [1993]

Gupta and Rosenthal [1991]

Leach and Leahy [1991]

Stulz, Walkling and Song [1990]

Mikkelson and Partch [1989]

Kapland [1989]

Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988b]

Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld [1985]

Steer and Cable [1978]

Stano [1976]

McEachern [1975]

Boudreaux [1973]

Radice [1971]

Larner [1970]

Monsen et al [1968]

 

 

Boyle, Carter and Stover [1998]

Slovin and Sushka [1993]

Jensen and Murphy [1990]

Agrawal and Mandelker [1990]

Malatesta and Walkling [1988]

Jarrell and Poulsen [1988b]

Jarrell and Poulsen [1987]

Johnson et al. [1985]

DeAngelo and Rise [1983]

Dann and DeAngelo [1983]

Thonet and Poensgen [1979]

Ware [1975]

Larner [1966]

Short and Keasey [1999]

Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan [1999]

McConnell and Servaes [1995]

Hubbard and Palia [1995]

Keasey, Short and Watson [1994]

Curcio [1994]

Chen, Hexter and Hu [1993]

Hermalin and Weisback [1991]

McConnell and Servaes [1990]

Wruck [1989]

Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988a]

 

Rozeff and Zaman [1998]

Cho [1998]

Yermack [1997]

Loderer and Martin [1997]

Kole [1996]

Rozeff and Zaman [1988]

Pope, Morris and Peel [1990]

Seyhun [1986]

Demsetz [1986]

Givoli and Palmon [1985]

Baesel and Stein [1979]

Finnerty [1976]

Jaffe [1974b]

Pratt and De Vera [1970]

Loire and Niederhoffer [1968]

Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia [1999]

Pedersen and Thomsen [1999]

Eckbo and Smith [1998]

Mikkelson, Partch [1997]

Agrawal and Knoeber [1996]

Strickland, Wiles and Zenner [1996]

Denis and Denis [1994]

Zeckhauser and Pound [1990]

Loderer and Sheehan [1989]

Murali and Welch [1989]

Holderness and Sheehan [1988]

Friend and Lang [1988]

Cubbin and Leech [1986]

Demsetz and Lehn [1985]

Madden [1982]

Levin and Levin [1982]

Jacquemin and Ghellinck [1980]

Bothwell [1980]

Holl [1977]

Round [1976]

Holl [1975]

Sorenson [1974]

Palmer [1973]

Elliot [1972]

Kamerschen [1968]

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