Ownership structure

Introduction: The ownership structure is defined by the distribution of equity with regard to votes and capital but also by the identity of the equity owners. These structures are of major importance in corporate governance because they determine the incentives of managers and thereby the economic efficiency of the corporations they manage. A classic reference is Jensen and Meckling [1976]. An excellent newer reference on the topic is Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan [1999].

Contents

• Table - Hypotheses: Effects of ownership structures on corporate performance and other other kinds of institutions of relevance for corporate governance.
• Exhibition - Theory review: A review of the theory on managerial ownership and financial performance.
• Table - Review of empirical studies by hypothesis: Empirical studies on managerial ownership and performance.
• Table - Review of empirical studies alphabetically: Empirical studies on ownership structure and performance.
• Exhibition - Incentives and managerial entrenchment: The Morck et al. [1988] argument about incentives and managerial entrenchment.
• Empirical model - Ownership and performance: The relation between managerial ownership and financial performance.
• Table - The elastic concept of property rights: The property rights for respectively equity, debt, leases and human capital.
• Exhibition - Ownership structures: Kinds of ownership structures in large firms.
• Exhibition - Ownership relations: The financial system and its agency relations.
• Table - International corporate governance: Tentative characterizations of legal and empirical state of large firm ownership structure in various countries as of 1980-95: 1) Developing countries. 2) Germany. 3) Japan. 4) Anglo-American countries. 5) Denmark.