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Table:
Hypotheses - Effects of remuneration systems on performance and other
incentive mechanisms in corporate governance Click here to see an exhibition on these issues and their relation to other hypotheses in corporate governance. |
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6) From incentive based compensation to financial performance |
6A: Incentive correlation argument: Remuneration systems that
correlate the management’s salary with financial performance may motivate
them to increase financial performance (Hart and Holmström [1987, part 1]). 6B: Incentive correlation incentive crime
argument: Remuneration
systems that correlate the management’s salary with financial performance may
motivate incompetent and opportunistic managers to use their power to fake
the earnings of the firm they manage. Forging the accounts is not possible in
the long-term so although in the short-term this kind of argument should
cause managerial salary and financial performance to be positively correlated
in the long-term the effect should be highly significant and negative. The
latter is also the case because the management is assumed to be incompetent
and the longer they stay in power the more money the firm will loose.
Furthermore, it should be expected that countries that do not have a legal
system that punishes this kind of managerial fraud heavily should suffer more
from this kind of crimes. 6C: Compensation
level argument: Higher managerial compensation may result in higher
financial performance because higher wages are able to attract the most
competent managers. 6D: Rent
extortion argument: All managerial compensation decreases financial
performance simply because it ceteris
paribus reduces the residual profits. Extraordinarily high managerial
remuneration may therefore have a significant and negative effect on the
overall financial performance. 6E: Fat wallet no care argument: Very high levels of managerial compensation cause the managers to become too rich too fast to care about continuing to work hard to keep his/her job. |
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