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Table:
Hypotheses - Effects of decision systems on performance and other
incentive mechanisms in corporate governance Click here to see an exhibition on these issues and their relation to other hypotheses in corporate governance. |
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5) From decision system to financial performance |
5A: The
separation of control between a team of executives and a board of directors
may increase financial performance by mitigating the possibility of
self-dealing among the firms’ top management (Fama and Jensen [1983a, 1983b]). More
information. |
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14A: The presence of an independent remuneration committee in the board of directors may help to improve the efficiency of the remuneration system by minimizing the risk of self-dealing among managers. |
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25A: Decisions regarding capital structure may matter because it could be used as an instrument to discipline the management. For instance, managers may prefer less leverage than the board of directors or the owners would prefer. |
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34A: The
existence of differential voting rights and staggered boards may prevent the
market for corporate control from functioning smoothly. |
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26A: The
presence of an independent recruitment committee in the board of directors
may help to improve the efficiency of the market for management services. |
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